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Abstract  
Discussion about the social network Twitter often concerns its role in political discourse,             
involving the question of when an expression of opinion becomes offensive, immoral, and/or             
illegal, and how to deal with it. Given the growing amount of offensive communication on the                
internet, there is a demand for new technology that can automatically detect hate speech, to               
assist content moderation by humans. This comes with new challenges, such as defining             
exactly what is free speech and what is illegal in a specific country, and knowing exactly what                 
the linguistic characteristics of hate speech are. To shed light on the German situation, we               
analyzed over 50,000 right-wing German hate tweets posted between August 2017 and April             
2018, at the time of the 2017 German federal elections, using both quantitative and qualitative               
methods. In this paper, we discuss the results of the analysis and demonstrate how the insights                
can be employed for the development of automatic detection systems.  
Keywords: ​hate speech, social media, natural language processing, machine learning 
  
1 Introduction 
During the 2015 European refugee crisis, nearly half a million refugees arrived in Germany              
(Eurostat 2017). This was more than double than the year before, with Germany’s Chancellor              
Angela Merkel famously stating “Wir schaffen das” (‘we can do this’). Most of the refugees               
were young men from Muslim countries, reportedly including some Islamic State militants            
disguised as asylum seekers (Reuters 2016). During this time, the country also witnessed a              
number of violent incidents, such as the 2015 New Year’s Eve sexual assaults, where groups               
of young male refugees sexually assaulted women in Cologne, or the December 2016 Berlin              
attack, where an Islamic State militant drove a hijacked truck into a Christmas market, killing               
12 and injuring 56. This sharply polarized the German sentiment towards refugees (YouGov             
2016). In wake of these events, the 2017 German federal elections experienced a considerable              
rise in right-wing populism, with the political party Alternative für Deutschland ​(AfD)            
achieving a striking success with 12.6% of the votes.  
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Social media such as Twitter and Facebook are believed to have played an important role in                
the electoral debate, mainly in propelling increasingly polarizing rhetoric. To illustrate this,            
Conover, Ratkiewicz, Francisco, Gonçalves, Menczer, & Flammini (2011) used a cluster           
analysis to examine 250,000 Twitter messages (tweets) posted in the lead-up to the US              
congressional midterm elections. They found a segregated partisan structure with few           
retweets between left and right-wing Twitter users. Davey & Ebner (2017:23) analyzed            
online right-wing partisan structure for the 2017 German federal elections, and report an             
increased connectivity between far-right activists and their followers. Such segregated ‘echo           
chambers’ of like-minded users lend themselves to more extreme sentiments than would be             
the case in face-to-face interactions (Colleoni, Rozza, & Arvidsson 2014). Kreißel, Ebner,            
Urban, & Guhl (2018:12) claim that only a small minority of German Facebook users (5%)               
are responsible for most of the online hate speech. These users can mostly be traced to AfD                 
and the Austrian Identitäre Bewegung (IB). 
The German Network Enforcement Act ( ​Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz ​, NetzDG) now forces         
social media networks to systematically review reported hate speech (see section 3.1). For the              
most part, the response by IT companies has been cautious. Twitter has argued that ‘no magic                
algorithm’ exists for detecting extremist content (Twitter 2016), and Facebook has stated that             
it will take 5 to 10 years to develop reliable AI detection systems (Reuters 2018). Apart from                 
the technical challenges with automatic hate speech detection, regulators also have to decide             
to what extent they leave the challenge up to AI, especially since detection algorithms have               
also been criticized for promoting censorship and/or perpetuating bias.  
In this paper, we present our analysis of online hate speech following the 2017 German               
federal elections, and an attempt for the automatic detection of such discourse on Twitter, a               
popular microblogging platform with short, publicly visible messages (280 characters). We           
first discuss the steps taken to collect relevant data (section 2) before we provide an overview                
of what constitutes right-wing German hate speech from a legal and linguistic perspective             
(sections 3 and 4). We then outline the technical details of our machine learning approach               
(section 5), and discuss our findings with respect to ethics and future applications (section 6). 
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2 Methods & Materials 
2.1 Data Collection 
Between August 2017 and April 2018, we collected over 50,000 hateful tweets from 100+              
right-wing German Twitter users, using the Pattern toolkit (De Smedt & Daelemans 2012)             
and the Twitter API. To collect the data, we manually identified 112 subversive Twitter              
profiles and then automatically collected their tweets. Subversive profiles are those that (1)             
post tweets containing racial slurs, profanity, and violent rhetoric, (2) do so repeatedly and              
consistently, and (3) indicate far-right ideology, either directly (i.e., in the profile description)             
or indirectly (e.g., through coded language or visual metaphors). For each profile, we started              
by searching Twitter for derogatory keywords, such as ​Neger (‘nigger’), and examined the             
search results. If a profile posted vigorously about refugees, and had three or more tweets that                
could be considered offensive or illegal (see section 3.1 for a definition of these terms), it was                 
retained. About 50% of these profiles posted 250 tweets or less in the 9-month period. About                
25% posted 750 or more. One profile posted nearly 3,000 tweets (~10/day) and was banned               
from Twitter. Many of these profiles (about 65%) mention each other extensively, which             
supports Conover et al (2011) and Davey & Ebner (2017).  
We also collected 50,000 ‘safe’ tweets for comparison. These include about 20,000 tweets by              
more than 35 elected German politicians (evenly from all elected parties), who we expected              
to talk about relevant topics without posting offensive content. They also include 30,000             
German tweets by as many Twitter users, talking about family, work, holidays, and so on. By                
comparing both datasets side-by-side using statistical methods such as feature selection, we            
can reveal stylistic cues that uniquely identify hate speech. 
The EU asserts that IT companies now remove over 70% of reported hate speech (EU Memo                
18-262, January 2018), although there is no accepted procedure to decide what kind of              3
language is hateful (cf. also section 3). In our case, 90% of the profiles used in our analysis                  
were still online in April 2018. In the 9-month period from August to April, we observed less                 
than 10 suspensions out of 100+ subversive profiles.  
3 ​http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-262_en.htm 
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In compliance with the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), no personal data             4
was retained after the analysis except for the tweet IDs, which can be used to reconstruct the                 
dataset with the Twitter API if necessary. 
2.2 User Profiles 
Over 25% of the profiles in the dataset contain neo-Nazi or extremist right-wing cues in their                
username, for instance, neo-Nazi ciphers and abbreviations. Five usernames end in -88, a             
substitution cipher for HH or ​Heil Hitler ​(Turner-Graham 2015). Two end in -18 (AH, ​Adolf               
Hitler​) and another two in -59 (EI, ​Eil Itler ​). One username contains two lightning emoticons               
for SS, which in combination with the historic pictures posted by the user is an obvious                
reference to Third Reich SS. Two usernames contain an IB prefix, referring to the Austrian               
Identitäre Bewegung (Hentges, Kökgiran, & Nottbohm 2015). Three usernames contain          
references to Nazi occultism, e.g., Thule Society or the Holy Grail (Goodrick-Clarke 1993).             
Four usernames can be associated with Teutonic mythology, mentioning Norse gods such as             
Thor and Freya, or Norse mythological creatures such as frost giants ( ​Hrimthursen​). Three             
usernames mention the Black Front, the Aryan race, or nerve gas, and two profiles support               
neo-Nazi music bands and hooliganism. Other cues of right-wing extremism are racial slurs,             
used in three usernames, and grandiose proclamations such as being a ‘Guardian of Germany’              
or a ‘Defender of the West’ (another three).  
Some of these cues could be coincidental, especially the ciphers. But this is ruled out by                
examining the user’s profile picture and profile content. Several users also have a profile              
picture with a ​völkisch rune (Mees 2008), crusader heraldry (Takács 2015), Hitler parodies,             
portraits of or quotes by Nazi frontmen, or various other explicit imagery, such as German               
landmarks burning in flames, rioting, skulls, wolf packs, or crusader knights.  
Most profile descriptions contain anti-refugee statements (e.g., ​Gegen Islamismus, ​Islam-          
kritiker ​), pro-National Socialism ( ​National Sozialistisch, NS Jetzt ​), or pro-white power          
statements ( ​White Power Worldwide​). Profile descriptions are particularly revealing about the           
image users want to project about themselves. Some state their mission explicitly, either by              
proclaiming to be a member of (for example) the far-right network Reconquista Germanica,             
or with statements like “Stoppt die Islamisierung Deutschlands” (‘stop the islamization of            
Germany’). Some users give less explicit hints about how to interpret their tweets: “Politisch              
4 ​https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection_en 
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inkorrekt” (‘politically incorrect’) or “Polizei- und Nachrichtenmeldungen über übergriffige         
Flüchtlinge und Migranten” (‘information about criminal refugees and immigrants from          
police and media reports’). Others highlight ideological preferences (“ungläubig, islamophob,          
populistisch” ‘irreligious, islamophobic, populist’) or demonstrate education (“Akademiker        
ohne ausgeprägtes Gutmenschentum” ‘academic without pronounced do-goodiness’). Some        
users add famous quotes that can be interpreted as ideological statements, such as “Wenn              
Unrecht zu Recht wird, wird Widerstand zur Pflicht!” (‘when injustice becomes law,            
resistance becomes duty’; Bertolt Brecht). 
Despite some users’ self-proclaimed education, language errors are common in the dataset.            
Many users post actively, so misspellings can be attributed to typos. Many users also do not                
use capitalization, but this is a known feature of the medium: it is common on social media to                  
write without punctuation, especially when upset. But there are also numerous errors that             
indicate a foreign speaker, which becomes obvious in tweets with major syntactic errors, or              5
with specific types of grammatical errors such as gender.   6
This finding is interesting insofar as it indicates that German hate speech on Twitter is not                
necessarily restricted to native German speakers. However, errors are certainly not restricted            
to non-native speakers, but could also indicate a low language proficiency. This is apparent in               
minor grammatical errors explicable by the transfer of grammatical structures from spoken            
non-standard varieties to a written context, as in “Wem wundert das?” (dative case of ​wer               
instead of accusative case).  
 
  
5 ​In “Unter Burka jede möglichen Figur kann sich verstecken. Daher Burkaträgerinnen sind undefinierbare Objekte *g* wie ​UFO 's”, ​Burka                    
is missing an article and the verbs ​kann​ and ​sind​ should come directly after the adverbial and the adverb. 
6 ​In “​ICH wünsche Trump langes Leben und genau ​die Gegenteil wünsche ich zum Merkel und die ​politische Bande; Muss reserviert ​für Die                       
ganze Mafia Bande !! Der Zeit wird kommen!!!! Brauchen nur neues ​Wahl!”, an article is missing before ​langes ​, there is an error with the                        
passive in ​reserviert​, the pronoun ​wir ​ is dropped before ​brauchen​, and gender errors (​das Gegenteil​, ​die Zeit​, etc.).  
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3 Defining Hate Speech 
There is no universal definition of hate speech, perhaps as argued by Berger (2018) because               
of the far-right’s proximity to political power. In general terms, hate speech can be seen as                
the communicative production of human inferiority (Sponholz 2018:48). It is a heterogeneous            
phenomenon that does not necessarily always involve attitudes of hatred (Meibauer 2013:3;            
Brown 2017:432). In legal terms, the definition of hate speech depends on the regulations in               
each individual country. This is a challenge in light of removing online content. For example,               
the Encyclopedia of the American Constitution defines hate speech as “any communication            
that disparages a person or a group on the basis of some characteristic such as race, color,                 
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, nationality, religion, or other characteristic” (Nockleby          
2000). It is rarely penalized in the US, where freedom of speech is absolute and protected by                 
the First Amendment (Cohen 2014:247). Exceptions can include defamation, fighting words           
(“personal epithets hurled face-to-to face at another individual which are likely to cause the              
average addressee to fight”, Stone 1994:80), threats of unlawful harm, and incitement to             
violence or other unlawful actions (cf. Fisch 2002). 
In Germany, hate speech is more likely to be penalized. Its legislation is representative of the                
EU approach to hate speech regulation, which counterbalances freedom of expression with            
values such as human dignity (Cohen 2014:238). More concretely, in case of a conflict, US               
legislation tends to give precedence to freedom of speech while EU nations tend to give               
precedence to human dignity. Additionally, EU legislation also penalizes hate speech that            
targets groups, whereas US legislation is more restricted to penalizing speech that targets             
individuals (Cohen 2014:238f). This is also reflected in the EU’s Code of Conduct on              
countering illegal hate speech online, which defines hate speech as “the public incitement to              
violence or hatred directed to groups or individuals on the basis of certain characteristics,              
including race, colour, religion, descent and national or ethnic origin”.   7
German legislation in particular shows a “heightened sensitivity toward individual dignity           
and the potential harms of violating these values”, which evolved from past incidences during              
the Nazi regime (Cohen 2014:240). This includes, specifically, the prohibition of Holocaust            
denial ( ​ARTICLE 19 2018:21). In general, §5(1) of the German ​Grundgesetz protects freedom             
of speech and prohibits censorship, but it is overruled when personal dignity is in danger               
7 ​http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-262_en.htm  
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(§5(2)). Infringements of personality rights are illegal and specified in German criminal law             
( ​Strafgesetzbuch ​, StGB), such as incitement to criminal behavior ( ​Öffentliche Auf- forderung           
zu Straftaten ​, §111 StGB), incitement of the masses ( ​Volksverhetzung ​, §130 StGB), insult            
( ​Beleidigung ​, §185 StGB), defamation ( ​Üble Nachrede​, §186 StGB), slander ( ​Verleumdung ​,          
§187 StGB), coercion ( ​Nötigung ​, §240 StGB), and intimidation ( ​Bedrohung ​, §241 StGB)           
(Puneßen 2016). Also relevant is defamation or slander of a politician ( ​Üble Nachrede und              
Verleumdung gegen Personen des politischen Lebens ​, §188 StGB) (Griffen 2017).  
Tweets qualifying as an offence as per StGB can be legally pursued. It is this kind of illegal                  
hate speech (as well as fake news) that the Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG), effective in               
Germany as of October 1, 2017, pertains to. Reported illegal content ( ​Beschwerden über             
rechtswidrige Inhalte​, §3 NetzDG) must now be systematically reviewed within 24 hours.            
One type of content that is problematic here is satire (irony, ridicule), for which various cases                
of overblocking have been observed ( ​ARTICLE​ 19 2018:24).  
A common argument against NetzDG is that it constitutes censorship, by restricting freedom             
of speech. However, NetzDG only fosters the removal of content that was not protected by               
freedom of speech even before its introduction. In the dataset, the number of clearly illegal               
messages is relatively small. Table 1 shows a sample of tweets that qualify for discussion in                
terms of the above-mentioned articles. 
 
CASE  EXAMPLE 
INCITEMENT 
§111 StGB 
 ​DE: ​ ​Findet diese Drecksau und entmannt sie an Ort und Stelle. 
 ​EN:  ​Find the pig and kill him. 
INCITEMENT 
§130 StGB 
 ​DE: ​ ​Wir müssen uns wehren sonst sind wir bald Fremde. 
 ​EN:  ​We have to fight back now or we will soon be foreigners in our own country. 
INSULT 
§185 StGB 
 ​DE: ​ ​Verpiss dich aus Deutschland du scheiss Kreatur. 
 ​EN:  ​Piss off and leave Germany, you nasty creature. 
SLANDER 
§186 StGB 
 ​DE: ​ ​Steigt Motumbo aus der Bahn, ist er sicher schwarz gefahn. 
 ​EN:  ​Mutombo will surely have no train ticket. 
SLANDER 
§188 StGB 
 ​DE: ​ ​Schulz muss erst mal das Saufen aufgeben, zum Wohle seiner Partei. 
 ​EN:  ​Schulz needs to give up drinking for the sake of his party. 
Table 1​. Examples of German hate speech compared to German criminal law. 
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Many instances of online group-focused enmity are currently in limbo between legally            
acceptable and illegal (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2017). For example, while           
StGB clearly differentiates between simply spreading defamatory information, and knowing          
that this information is incorrect (slander), the distinction is harder to make in reality. With               
respect to European hate speech legislation, “the application and interpretation of the existing             
criminal provisions on ‘hate speech’ is generally inconsistent” ( ​ARTICLE​ 19 2018:6).  
We would argue to understand hate speech beyond its purely legal application, not only              
because of the lack of a clear-cut distinction between legal and illegal, but also because               
content moderation in social networks extends beyond what is illegal. For example, Facebook             
is known to apply its own rules, which only in part correspond to what should be removed by                  
NetzDG. Hate speech is now widely studied and considered a problem not so much because               8
of the (relatively few) illegal cases, but because it is an indicator of society’s polarization.               
The analysis thus includes “‘[h]ate speech’ that is lawful [...], but which nevertheless raises              
concerns in terms of intolerance and discrimination” ( ​ARTICLE 19 2018:9) – tweets that are              
not illegal but ‘merely’ offensive, i.e., constituting either an insult or abuse. According to              
Ruppenhofer, Siegel, & Wiegand (2018:1f), this means messages that convey disrespect and            
contempt, by ascribing qualities to people that portray them as unworthy or unvalued (insult),              
or constitute group-based offense by ascribing a social identity to a person that is judged               
negatively by society or part of society (abuse).  
Many tweets in the dataset involve a tendentiously framed dissemination of news, as people              
interpret news by connecting events to personal experience and world views (Maireder &             
Ausserhofer 2014:307). By framing we mean ‘select[ing] some aspects of perceived reality            
and mak[ing] them more salient in a communicating text’ (Entman 1993:52). For example, a              
crime committed by a single refugee may be framed as something that all refugees do all the                 
time. This interpretation is often explicitly stated, as in “Dieser Mehrfach-Straftäter ist der             
Beweis: Multikulti funktioniert... Nicht!” (‘this repeat offender proves that multiculturalism          
does not work’). Here, one criminal act is used to imply that multiculturalism automatically              
leads to an increased crime rate. The reported event may either be real news or fake news.  
  
8 https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards  
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Real news. Many tweets are factual, as in “Dieser Mann schnitt seiner zweijährigen Tochter              
die Kehle durch” (‘man cuts throat of baby girl’), referring to a news article about a Pakistani                 
man. Citing crime reports is not hate speech, but many users in the dataset do so repeatedly                 
and exclusively about people of foreign origin. On average, a profile in the dataset posts a                
tweet like this every three hours. By comparison, German politicians posted a tweet every six               
hours during their electoral campaign. The users in the dataset provide a continuous stream of               
negative tweets implicating foreigners in criminal and violent activities. 
Fake news. ​This stream of crime reports often includes hearsay and prejudice. In the April               
2018 Münster attack, a man drove a van into the crowd in front of a restaurant, killing 4 and                   
injuring more than 20. One AfD politician responded by tweeting “Wir schaffen das!”,             
suggesting that the incident involved refugees, but the perpetrator turned out to be a German               
man with psychiatric problems. Many users in the dataset tweet about non-existent jihadist             
attacks, in this case for example: “Muslimattacken mit Autos lohnen wieder. Deutsche wacht             
endlich auf!” (‘Muslim car attacks pay off again. Wake up, Germans!’). The wake-up call is               
reminiscent of the Third Reich slogan ​Deutschland Erwache​.  
Such messages constitute a new form of propaganda. Generally, propaganda can be defined             
as a “deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct            
behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett &               
O’Donnell 2019:6). In today’s digital society, it is increasingly associated with grassroots            
activities and fake news (Jowett & O’Donnell 2019:3-5). Most examples we found are not              
systematic ​in the sense that there is some elite conspiracy, but, as Davey & Ebner (2017)                
show, online activities of right-wing extremist networks are now well-organized, raising           
security concerns (Europol 2019). Farkas & Neumayer (2018:3f) point to an early distinction             
by Ellul (1965) between vertical and horizontal propaganda. Although propaganda in a digital             
context cannot be fully grasped by this binary distinction (Farkas & Neumayer 2018:7), the              
notion of horizontal propaganda, i.e., emerging from small groups who cooperate on the basis              
of a shared ideology, seems relevant for right-wing extremism on social media.  
In conclusion, our working definition of hate speech includes illegal utterances but also legal              
cases that are nonetheless offensive, or those used for propaganda. As argued by Waseem,              
Davidson, Warmsley, & Weber (2017), abuse can be described in two broad dimensions: the              
specificity of the target and the degree of explicitness. They discern four categories useful for               
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our work: (1) directed and explicit, i.e., directed towards a specific target and unambiguous,              
such as slurs, (2) directed and implicit, i.e., targeted but ambiguous, such as sarcasm, (3)               
generalized and explicit, i.e., not targeting anybody specific, and (4) generalized and implicit.             
Most of the dataset is generalized hate speech, which is typical of political communication              
(directed hate speech being typical of cyberbullying). 
 
4 Analysis 
To establish what online hate speech looks like on the linguistic level, and how it is used in                  
context, we used a combination of qualitative approaches with quantitative techniques from            
Natural Language Processing (NLP), since the two should go hand-in-hand in research about             
political communication on Twitter (Pal & Gonawela 2017). For the qualitative part, we first              
examined a random subsample of 2,000 tweets. We then compared our insights to supporting              
quantitative evidence. We focused on a selection of self-chosen aspects of hate speech: the              
targets of hateful tweets and the designations used to describe them (4.1), lexis in general               
(4.2), linguistic creativity (4.3), and speech acts (4.4).  
At first glance, not all tweets in the qualitative sample are hateful. There are also non-hateful                
messages for example extending good wishes, as in “Schönen Urlaub dir/euch!” (‘have a nice              
holiday’). Non-political posts are less likely to be offensive, with the exception of football              
tweets, which perhaps is indicative of the connection between right-wing extremism and            
football ultras (Pilz n.d.). But non-political tweets are rare in the sample (<10%), suggesting              
that Twitter is used more purposefully for propaganda (section 3).  
The majority of tweets relate to political parties and political ideology, or target immigration              
and purported crimes by refugees. Note that the examples presented are parts of tweets or               
tweets as a whole, including grammar or spelling mistakes. Some tweets have been redacted              
to protect the users’ identity, while retaining the gist of their message. 
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4.1 Targeted Groups 
While hate speech is disparaging by nature, disparaging tweets do not always necessarily use              
disparaging language, e.g., ​der ​friedliche Islam (‘peaceful Islam’) is used ironically.           
However, they do often resort directly to disparaging words, such as insults or negatively              
connoted words. These linguistic cues are very useful to expose who is targeted by politically               
motivated hate tweets, namely immigrants (~26%), political opponents (22%), and other           
German voters or Germany as a whole (13%). The dataset includes other targets besides these               
three, for example women (especially feminists) and homosexuals, but less frequently.  
Immigrants and refugees in particular are considered a danger to Germany’s safety, which is              
why hate speech targeting this group is abundant (cf. Geyer 2017). Immigrants are designated              
as ​Nafris ​, ​Invasoren ​(‘invaders’), ​Asyltouristen ​(‘asylum tourists’), ​Merkel-Gäste ​(‘Merkel’s         9
guests’), Mob ​, and occasionally also as ​Illegale ​(‘illegal residents’), ​Wohlstandsflüchtlinge          
(‘fortune seekers’), ​Bunte ​(‘multi-colored people’), and as ​Zudringlinge ​(‘intruders’). They          
are portrayed as being ​kriminell (‘criminal’), ​unterentwickelt ​(‘primitive’), ​Müll (‘garbage’),          
Abschaum ​(‘scum’), ​Pack ​(‘vermin’), ​Parasiten (‘parasites’), and ​Gesindel ​(‘rabble’).         
Expressions such as ​Musel​, ​Salafistenschwester ​, ​Kampfmuslimas ​, ​Burka-Frauen ​, or ​Vollbärte         
(‘full beard’) are used in relation to Muslims, ​Mutombo ​, ​Bongo ​, ​or ​Kloneger (‘toilet nigger’)              
in relation to African immigrants.  
Political opponents include individuals from the entire political spectrum, but most notably            
SPD politicians like Martin Schulz ( ​Arschkriecher ‘brown-noser’), Heiko Maas ( ​Vollpfosten          
‘idiot’), and Ralf Stegner ( ​Einzeller ‘single-cell organism’), or CDU politicians Stanislaw           
Tillich ( ​Bodensatz ‘dregs’) and, in 8% of tweets, Angela Merkel ( ​Volksverräterin ‘betrayer of             
the people’, ​blöde Kuh ‘stupid cow’). Generally, opponents include all left-wing politicians            
and parties ( ​Verbrecher ‘criminals’, ​Sozi Clowns ‘socialist clowns’, ​SPD Heuchler ‘Social           
Democrat hypocrites’, ​linkes Faschistenpack ‘left-wing fascist vermin’, ​Grünfaschisten        
‘green fascists’), which are portrayed as being ​dumm ​(‘dumb’), ​gehirnamputiert (‘brainless’),           
and ​neokolonial ​(‘neocolonial’). They spread ​Gelaber (‘nonsense’) and ​Lügenpropaganda         
(‘propagandist lies’) in concert with the ​Lügenpresse​ (‘fake news media’).  10
9 ​Nafri is short for ​Nordafrikaner ​(‘North African’) or ​Nordafrikanischer Intensivtäter ​(‘North African repeat offender’), and used in police                   
jargon before it spread to general language. 
10 ​Lügenpresse was elected Non-word of the year 2014 in Germany, and has a long history (cf. Amendt 2015; Heine 2015). It dates back to                         
mid-19th century but its usage increased greatly after 1914. It was used in Nazi propaganda by Joseph Goebbels. 
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Voters ​that have a positive attitude towards refugees, and mainstream voters in general, are              
designated as ​Gutmenschen (‘do-gooders’) or ​Traumtänzer (‘dreamers’). By consequence,         11
Germany is perceived as being in decline and referred to as ​Buntland ​(‘rainbow nation’),              
Dummstaat ​(‘idiot nation’), ​PlemPlemLand ​(‘nation of fools’), or ​Schandland ​(‘nation of           
shame’), and Berlin as a ​Bundeskloake (‘cesspit’) and ​Dreckloch ​(‘shithole’). Its citizens are             
perceived to be ​Idioten ​(‘idiots’) and ​verblödet​ (‘stupid’). 
4.2 Lexis 
4.2.1 Word Bias 
We want to know what vocabulary constitutes hate speech. In statistics, the chi-square test              
estimates how likely it is that an observed distribution is due to chance. For example, is it due                  
to chance that the hate speech dataset contains a lot of derogatory words, or do all forms of                  
online communication use derogatory words? In NLP, the chi-square test is used as a method               
for feature selection ​ ​(Liu & Motoda 2007), to automatically expose relevant keywords.  
We can count the number of times that a word occurs in all ​tweets (50,000 hate + 50,000                  
safe), and then observe if it occurs more often in the hate subset. We would expect function                 
words such as ​der ​, ​die​, ​das to occur equally often in any kind of text, since they are usually                   
grammatically required. Contrarily, we would expect content words such as ​Muslimenhorden           
to be absent from the usual tweets that people post about their pets or cooking skills. As it                  
turns out in this case, thousands of words ( ​~​4,500) ​are significantly biased ( ​p​<0.05) and occur               
much more often in the hate speech data, including racial slurs, ideological insults, and verbs               
expressing aggression.   12
Table 2 shows a sample of biased words, with the total number of times that they appear in                  
both datasets (#), sorted by the likelihood that they appear in the hate data (%) as opposed to                  
the safe data, along with an example. We can also use such words as cues to automatically                 
predict whether a text that we have not seen before is hateful (see section 5). 
  
11 ​Gutmensch​ was elected Non-word of the year 2015 in Germany, and dates back to 1922, when it was coined by columnist Karl Heinz 
Bohrer (Zifonun 2016:26) to describe people “that do not say everything that they want to say” to avoid provocation. 
12 ​Top 1,000 biased words: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1JCYspKqgNx0PSqy5YZ03t63ks1eoE1p5KzZ9O5BUkQU 
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  WORD # % HATE  EXAMPLE 
 Nafri 21 99%  nafri müll raus aus deutschland!!! 
 Salafisten 42 98%  Soso, die Salafistenschwester ruft also zum Kampf auf ​  
 sexuell 57 96%  islamische Prediger mit gewisser Neigung zu sexueller Gewalt 
 Horden 15 93%  bewaffnet euch vor den heranstürmenden Horden 
 Volk 518 90%  fahrt zur Hölle, das Deutsche Volk läst sich nicht mehr verarschen 
 Gutmenschen 160 90%  Gutmenschen ist es scheissegal wieviele Mädchen sterben 
 brutal 72 89%  brutale Rumänen überfallen Senioren 
 Patrioten 60 88%  Das ist eine Kampfansage gegen uns Patrioten. Es wird ernst. 
 töten 103 87%  ich würde Töten–bei Gott das schwöre ich! 
 Kopftuch 96 85%  Das habe ich auch schon gesehen.....Kopftuch in fettem X7-BMW. 
 Neger 27 85%  Was waren sie denn nun? Araber, Nafris, Neger? 
  578 85%  Findet diese Drecksau und entmannt sie an Ort und Stelle. ​  
  132 83%  im schutz seiner kettenhunde fühlt sich der stinker sicher! ​ ​ ​  
 Muslime 438 82%  Muslime schlagen mit Stöcken auf Zuhörer ein 
 Abschaum 69 77%  Einwanderung von Religiösem Abschaum = Riesenproblem ​  
 Gefährder 128 75%  Gefährder und Kriminelle? Die sollte man überall hin abschieben. 
 sofort 344 69%  Sofort müsste ihr ein Blitz in den Arsch fahren dieser Volksverräterin 
 müssen  1264 66%  die Invasoren müssen lernen 
Table 2​. Sample keywords in German hate speech. 
4.2.2 Word Co-occurrence 
Not all of these words are necessarily hateful by themselves, e.g., ​Flüchtlinge is not a               
derogatory word, but can become so in combination with other words. To examine this, we               
used the Pattern toolkit to extract biased adjectives that co-occur with (precede) biased nouns,              
as in ​kriminelle Flüchtlinge ​. ​Thousands of biased adjective-noun pairs can be found almost             
exclusively in the hate speech data (~3,500), each of them usually occurring once or twice.   13
Table 3 shows a sample of biased adjective-noun pairs, most of which are generalized and               
explicit (cf. section 3). For each pair, we have indicated the general targets occurring in most                
definitions of hate speech (i.e., race, gender, religion, ideology). Racist expressions typically            
portray dark-skinned people as dangerous and savage (e.g., predators, hordes), and/or ridicule            
Muslims by using negative stereotypes (e.g., bearded carpet kissers). Sexist expressions often            
13 ​Top 1,000 biased adjective-noun pairs: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gVfkxOzLiv47WH506eDseIji96vD2Q4ofFVTiVNUl4c 
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decribe women as being naive and promiscuous (e.g., stupid sluts). Expressions that target             
religion depict Muslims as violent, misogynist, and unclean (e.g., stinking hate preachers).            
Expressions that target ideology depict left-wing voters as foolish and deceptive. Some            
expressions address a combination of targets, as in ​weibliche Grüfri (‘Green fundamentalist            
chatterbox, an adaption of ​Nafri​). 
ADJECTIVE NOUN RACE GENDER RELIGION IDEOLOGY 
arbeitsscheue Sozialschmarotzer - - - ✓ 
bärtigen Teppichknutscher ✓ - ✓ - 
behaarte Kanakenfotzen ✓ ✓ - - 
blöde Schlampe - ✓ - - 
dreckige Salafistenpack - - ✓ - 
homosexuellen Zellennachbarn - ✓ - - 
linke Heuchlerbande - - - ✓ 
nordafrikanischen Horden ✓ - - - 
primitives Negergesindel ✓ - - - 
stinkenden Hasspredigern - - ✓ - 
schwarze Trans-Muslima ✓ ✓ ✓ - 
syrische Bestien ✓ - - - 
weibliche Grüfri - ✓ - ✓ 
widerliche Systemkriecherin - - - ✓ 
zwangsbekopftuchte Mädchen - ✓ ✓ - 
Table 3​. Sample word pairs in German hate speech. 
Since these word pairs (but by extension also many compounds) are blatant in connecting a               
target to a derogatory word, they are particularly useful to expose two core mechanisms in               
hate speech: dehumanization and stereotyping. 
Dehumanization can be defined as “processes associated with stripping groups or individu-            
als of human ‘essence’ and processes that compare groups or individuals with nonhumans”             
(Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson 2008:293). It has been used throughout history to             
pave the way for violence towards targeted out-groups (Haslam & Loughnan 2014:415).            
Some straightforward examples include comparisons to animals (e.g., apes, dogs, rats),           
infestations and diseases (e.g., parasites, pests), waste products (e.g., shit, trash), and            
implying a lack of intelligence or morality (barbarians, hordes). 
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Stereotypes are highly generalized beliefs about an out-group, often subconsciously rooted in            
intergroup relations with long histories, or consciously used to reinforce prejudices, for            
example to protect the in-group (Haslam & Loughnan 2014). Examples in the dataset include              
portrayals of politicians as being conniving and greedy, Muslims as screaming terrorists,            
immigrants as unemployed and loitering on street corners wearing jogging pants, and so on. 
Finally, biased adjective-noun pairs are often combined with verbs that express aggression,            
such as ​greifen ​(‘grab’, ~1,000 ​x ​), ​schlagen (‘beat’, 1,000​x​), ​kämpfen (‘fight’, 750​x​), ​stechen            
(‘stab’, 500​x ​), and ​klauen (‘rob’ 250​x​), as in “Dunkelhäutiger Unterhosenmann geht plötzlich            
auf Renterin los, schlägt und tritt sie fast zu Tode” (‘black man in underpants suddenly               
attacks elderly woman and nearly beats and kicks her to death’). 
4.2.3 Word Clusters 
As noted earlier, users in the hate speech dataset predominantly seem to post tweets about               
immigration, crime, and politics. To assert this observation, we experimented with NLP            
techniques that automatically group words into meaningful categories. We used skip-grams           
(Mikolov, Sutskever, Chen, Corrado, & Dean 2013) and spherical ​k​-means clustering           
(Hornik, Feinerer, Kober, & Buchta 2012) to compute three clusters ( ​k​=3) of the top 250               
most biased words. A skip-gram represents the context of a word, i.e., those words that               
frequently precede or succeed it over all tweets. Using skip-grams, a clustering algorithm can              
then group words that more often occur in the same context into a single category (e.g.,                
gewalttätigen Muslimen ​ / ​Terroristen​ / ​islamo-faschistoiden ​). 
Figure 1 shows a word cloud visualization of the three resulting clusters. The size of each                
word represents how often it appears in the hate speech dataset. For example, the second               
cluster groups words such as ​Terroristen​, ​Messer ​, and ​Islam ​, which often appear in the same               
context in hate tweets, with ​Islam appearing most often (~1,400x), and ​Messer (~450x) and              
Terroristen (~200x) less frequently. We can roughly label the respective clusters as            
immigration, crime, and politics, although there is large semantic overlap between them. In             
effect, many utterances in the hate speech dataset attempt to defame refugees, implicate them              
in crimes, and blame politicians at the same time. 
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The accompanying table in Figure 1 shows ten representative words for each cluster, and the               
number of times they occur: 
 
IMMIGRATION 
 Flüchtlinge 979 
 Syrer 257 
 Ausländer 179 
 Afghane 157 
 Asylanten 99 
 Einwanderer 85 
 Südländer 81 
 Türke 70 
 Migrant 63 
 Algerier 43 
 ...  ... 
 
 
CRIME 
 Mädchen 520 
 Messer 449 
 Terroristen 197 
 mord 168 
 schlagen 160 
 Verbrecher 143 
 Kriminalität 133 
 töten 108 
 Drogen 91 
 Brandanschlag 56 
 ...  ... 
 
 
POLITICS 
 Politiker 561 
 Antifa 540 
 Altparteien 176 
 Gutmenschen 163 
 Propaganda 163 
 Steuerzahler 136 
 Asylpolitik 123 
 Demonstranten 72 
 Statistik 67 
 Linksradikalen 61 
 ...  ... 
 
Figure 1​. Sample word clusters in German hate speech. 
4.2.5 Word Tree 
The linguistic context of a word is telling of the world view of the author, and visualizing this                  
context with a word tree can be a useful explanatory approach. To offer one example, Figure                
2 shows the word tree for ​Moslem ​, where the size of each word represents how often it                 
appears in the hate speech dataset. For example, ​kriminell and ​radikal appear more often in               
the vicinity before ​Moslem ​ than ​arme​ (‘poor’): 
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Figure 2​. Sample word tree in German hate speech. 
4.2.6 Word Polarity 
Sentiment Analysis (Pang & Lee 2008) pertains to automatically detecting whether a text is              
factual or subjective, and if it is subjective, whether it is positive or negative (i.e., polarity).                
This task has a long history in NLP, and many systems have been developed for different                
languages, typically with a predictive performance that ranges between 75-85%. We used the             
SentiWS lexicon (Remus, Quasthoff, & Heyer 2010) for German. It assigns scores to words              
(e.g., ​gut = +0.37, ​schlecht = ​−​0.77) that can be used to compute an average score for a given                   
text. We computed the average score for all tweets resulting in about 32% of the hate tweets                 
predicted as negative, against 22% of the safe tweets, or a 10% difference (Figure 3a).  
We briefly examined the relation between     
polarity and demographic variables (region     
and gender) in hate tweets. The top 10 most         
often mentioned nationalities in hate tweets     
include German, African (mostly Malinese,     
Somali, Nigerian), Turkish, Israeli, Syrian,     
Russian, Afghan, Saudi, Austrian, closely    
 
 
Figure 3a​. Sentiment in German hate speech. 
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followed by Romanian, Iraqi, Moroccan    
(Figure 3b).   14
Nearly all coverage of Somalis is negative       
(93%), as is coverage of Afghans (79%),       
Malinese (75%), Nigerians (73%), and also     
Turks (70%). The least negative content is       
about Austrians (48%) who are praised for      
their right-wing FPÖ victory in 2017. 
The hate tweets contain considerably more      
references (2:1 ratio) to women and girls       
( ​Frauen ​, ​Mädchen ​) than to men and boys       
( ​Männer ​, ​Jungen ​), and both more often in       
negative tweets. Note that such references      
may either target women or use them to       
target somebody else (Figure 3c).  
   
Figure 3b ​. References to region. 
 
 
Figure 3c​. References to gender. 
4.3 Linguistic Creativity 
Hate speech is not only marked by derogatory words or profanity. The dataset also shows that                
users can employ and bend language in a creative way to express protest against the current                
government, immigration policy, etc. This kind of creative language use typically involves            
lexis, but can also extend to other language levels such as syntax and grammar. We will                
restrict our brief observations to three typical cases of linguistic creativity in the dataset.  
Creative targeting ​. The designations for immigrants and politicians are often inventive and            
display various linguistic techniques. These include creative compounds like ​die Bundeskuh           
und ihr Idiotenstall (‘the Cowcellor and her stable of stupids’), ​Politmaden-Bürgermeister           
(‘maggot mayor’), or ​Maasdurchfallgesetz (‘Heiko Maas’ NetzDiarrhea law’). Other cases          
involve blends such as ​Erdowahn (‘Erdogoon’) and ​Religioten (‘religiots’). This is in line             
with findings for Italian data by Assimakopoulos, Baider, & Millar (2017:88).  
14 ​German appears most often because Germany is the central topic. Austrian is often mentioned because the Austrian immigration policy is                     
seen as a role model. African nationalities, along with Muslims (i.e., Afghans, Syrians and Iraqis), are considered the main source of                     
unwanted immigration. Turkish people are the largest group of immigrants in Germany and  criticized for supporting Erdoğan’s politics.  
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Creative metaphors. ​Metaphors are used within the argumentation to make an opinion more             
persuasive. One striking example targets Angela Merkel: “Ich denke das in Honeckers            
Versuchslabor nen Fenster angeklappt war. Und da kam die Merkel raus” (‘I think a window               
in Honecker’s lab was open and out came the Merkel’). Honecker and Merkel both originate               
from the eastern part of Germany. During the 1970s, with the Iron Curtain still in place, Erich                 
Honecker was the leader of East Germany (Deutsche Demokratische Republik, DDR), after            
being imprisoned as a communist during the Nazi regime. Conspiracy theories, which are             
rife, suggest a connection between the two politicians. Metaphors are also used to target              
immigration policy, as in “Dämlicher Deutsche Politiker verlangen praktisch von Deutsche           
Bürger; während Dein Haus verbrennt, ​DU sollst Löschaktionen nicht bei Dir, sondern bei             
Nachbarhaus führen.” This statement presents Germany as a burning house, while Germans            
put out fires in neighboring houses (probably a reference to other countries). In general,              
descriptions of politics and politicians are more creative than comments on the refugees’             
behavior. The latter tend to use widespread dehumanizing metaphors, particularly the parasite            
metaphor (cf. also Musolff 2015). 
Phraseological modification. Another persuasion strategy consists of using phraseological         
units such as proverbs, sayings, or film titles, either in their canonical or a modified form.                
Proverbs lend themselves to the aim of persuasion, captivating “wisdom, truth, morals, and             
traditional views in a metaphorical, fixed and memorizable form and which is handed down              
from generation to generation” (Mieder 1993:24). The same goes for famous quotes. For             
example, “Der Krug geht so lange zum Brunnen bis er bricht” (‘A jug is only useful in the                  
well as long as it remains intact’) encourages right-wing voters to keep fighting the system.               
Proverbs enable users to argue with easily understandable imagery that sums up complex             
challenges concisely. Here, they appear in various modified forms, as in “Verfassungsschutz            
beobachtet und wenn sie nicht gestorben sin, beobachten sie noch heute”, a modification of              15
the classic fairy tale ending ‘Und wenn sie nicht gestorben sind, dann leben sie noch heute’                
(‘they lived happily ever after’). Another example, “Warum in die Ferne schweifen, wenn das              
Fremde liegt so nah?”, has the canonical form ‘Warum in die Ferne schweifen, wenn das               16
Gute liegt so nah?’ (‘all you need is right here’).  
15 ​Free translation: ‘The Office for the Protection of the Constitution is monitoring the case and will continue to do so forever’. 
16 ​Free translation: ‘Why do we look at foreign countries if our country is full of foreigners?’ 
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The advantage of phraseological modifications is that they have a highly associative potential             
due to the underlying original form, that they are attention-grabbing, allow for adaptations to              
specific contexts, present complex information concisely, and/or highlight the producer’s          
intelligence (Jaki 2014:18). 
4.4 Speech Acts  
An analysis of tweets in terms of speech acts allows for describing the intention of what is                 
uttered. Speech Act Theory (Searle 2008) distinguishes between different illocutions, i.e.,           
meanings of utterances, and establishes assertives (e.g., ‘The ​EU is working on hate speech              
regulation’), declarations (‘I hereby fine you ​EUR 1500 for illegal hate speech’), directives             
(‘Remove this profile!’), commissives (‘We promise to remove the profile’), and expressives            
(‘We wish we had less hate speech on our platform’). This variety of illocutions can also be                 
found in hate speech (Sponholz 2018:65). There have been attempts for automatic speech act              
classification with Twitter data (e.g., Zhang, Gao, & Li 2011; Vosoughi & Roy 2016), but for                
English. Qualitative analysis of our data shows that hateful tweets are marked by some              
predominant (combinations of) speech acts and by indirect speech acts.  
Expressive speech acts are the most aggressive and disparaging ones, as in “wenn ich diese               
Kasperle in Ihren roten Clownkostümen sehe kommt mir das kotzen” (‘when I see these              
clowns in their red costumes, I could vomit’). They are usually accompanied by emojis, as in                
“mehr grüne ​ sollten nicht sprechen dürfen! ” (‘no more talk by greens’),             
where repeated emojis indicate distress, as in “​DANKE ​FRAU ​MERKEL ​ ​”.           
Expressive speech acts are used to vent negative emotions about politicians, political events,             
crime, etc. The majority is motivated by fear of change in Germany. Some are curses, like                
“Hoffentlich verrottet er in irgendeiner Ecke” (‘hope he rots in some dark corner’).  
Directive speech acts ​are also common in the dataset, usually in combination with hashtags.              
For example, #AntiKap refers to the Antikapitalistisches Kollektiv, a network of right-wing            
militant protesters, and is used to remind members to gather for protests to disrupt the system,                
as in “Den nationalen Aufbau unterstützen! #NSjetzt #KapitalismusZerschlagen #AntiKap”         
(‘Help us build our nation! National Socialism now, crush capitalism’). Another type of             
directive speech act calls to stop or reverse the intake of immigrants: “Obdachloser lebendig              
begraben! Man muss nicht lang überlegen, welche ‘Kultur’ hier wieder zugange war!            
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Abschaum finden und abschieben!” (‘Homeless man buried alive! Doesn’t take long to figure             
out which “culture” is at it again. Find the scum and deport it!’).  
Assertive speech acts ​are frequent in the dataset, but difficult to distinguish from expressive              
speech acts because retweets of news articles are often salted with an opinion. In cases like                
“Erzbischof beschreibt Migration als Waffe zur Islamisierung Europas” (‘archbishop         
describes migration as a weapon for the Islamization of Europe’), the distinction is clear. But               
it is less clear in “Familiennachzug: De Maizière schlägt ‘Vorab-Vereinbarung’ vor und will             
‘Spaltung der Gesellschaft überwinden’ Wenn ich schon das Transparent am Boden sehe,            
schwillt mir der Hals” (‘Family reunification: De Maizière suggests ‘prior agreement’ and            
wants to ‘overcome the division of society’. I get furious when I see the banner on the floor’),                  
which is a combination of facts and opinions. An accompanying photo shows refugees with a               
banner stating that no human being is illegal.  
Commissive speech acts are rare and usually constitute threats, e.g. “Erwischt es nur eine              
Freundin oder Bekannte von mir, leg ich den Pisser noch vorm Richter um ” (‘if this                
happens to a friend of mine, I will kill the bastard in front of the judge’).  
Indirect speech acts occur particularly with the blurring of facts and opinions. The utterance              
“Almans werden auf öffentlichen Plätzen von Nafris abgezogen” (‘blacks rob Germans at            
public places’) is one example, being an expressive disguised as an assertive. It is not a real                 
statement about the world, but part of a series of tweets by a user that exclusively spreads                 
various racial stereotypes. Another example is “Ich wünsche gute Heimreise” (‘safe travels            
home’), an amiable wish at first sight and as such an expressive speech act. In reality, the                 
illocution is a demand, i.e., calling on refugees to go back to Syria. This becomes clear in the                  
preceding part of the tweet, which claims that Islamic State in Syria has been annihilated.  
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5 Automatic Detection 
5.1 In-domain Evaluation 
Using Machine Learning (ML) techniques, we can take advantage of word bias and word              
co-occurrence to train a model that automatically detects hate speech. ML is a field of               
Artificial Intelligence aimed to develop algorithms that can ‘learn by example’. When shown             
a 1,000 German texts and a 1,000 English texts, a machine learning algorithm can infer that ​ü                 
and ​ß seldomly occur in English texts. Such cues can then be used to predict whether another                 
text is written in German or in English. In the same way, we can use examples of hate speech                   
and safe discourse to train a model to spot the differences. This works reasonably well on a                 
coarse-grained level, although the task is much more challenging on a fine-grained level, i.e.,              
predicting exactly what is illegal, exactly who is targeted, how to avoid false positives, and so                
on. To offer one example of a false positive: our model learned that ​Diät (‘diet’, as in                 
weight-watching) is related to hate speech, since it was shown many hateful examples about              
Diätenerhöhung (‘pay increase’, where ​Diät means a politician’s salary). This illustrates how            
deploying such automatic approaches can be problematic, falsely accusing weight watchers           
of proliferating hate speech is undesirable. 
ML algorithms expect their input to be vectorized, i.e., given as a set of vectors, where each                 
vector is a set of feature-weight pairs. In this case, each tweet could be a vector, the features                  
could be words, and the weights could be word count. We used the Perceptron algorithm and                
character trigrams as features. A character trigram consists of three consecutive characters,            
e.g., ​Flüchtling = ​{ ​Flü​, ​lüc​, ​üch​, ​cht​, ​htl​, ​tli​, ​lin​, ​ing ​} ​. Character trigrams efficiently                
model linguistic variation such as spelling errors, word inflections, function words, etc.            
Modelling ​Flüchtling and ​Flüchtlinge as character trigrams hence ensures that they have            
several overlapping features – all except the ​-nge​ trigram.  
Character trigrams ( ​CH3​) yield about 82% predictive performance. We added additional           17
features such as character bigrams ( ​CH2​), character unigrams ( ​CH1 = punctuation marks,            
emojis), word unigrams ( ​W1 = single words), and word bigrams ( ​W2 = word pairs), boosting               
the performance by 2% (Table 4). We also removed usernames ( ​@​) to prevent overfitting.              
Overfitting means that the model memorizes training examples instead of discovering general            
17 ​The weighted random baseline is 50%, i.e., a system randomly predicting hate or safe has a predictive performance of 50%. 
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patterns. Retaining usernames raises performance by 2%, but also means that the model             
becomes a blacklist of known usernames. It is possible that the model overfits on the writing                
style of the most prolific users, however. 
 
FEATURES ACCURACY 
CH3 CH2 CH1 W1 W2 @ P R 
✓ - - - - - 83.12 82.19 
✓ ✓ - - - - 83.02 82.61 
✓ ✓ ✓ - - - 82.82 82.63 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - 83.64 82.92 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - 84.21 83.97 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 86.23 86.09 
Table 4​. Overview of precision and recall for different features. 
We trained the single-layer averaged Perceptron algorithm (Collins 2002) with an average            
F1-score of 84.21%. The F1-score is the harmonic mean of recall and precision. Recall (R)               18
is an estimate of how many hateful tweets the model is able to detect. Precision (P) is an                  
estimate of how many tweets predicted as hateful are really hateful. For example, if the model                
marks every tweet that contains the word ​Flüchtling as hateful, its recall would be high but its                 
precision would also be low, since many people talk about refugees without spreading hate              
speech. Recall and precision are obtained by training the model on a set of tweets, and then                 
statistically testing its predictions on a different set. The results will include true positives,              
true negatives, false positives, and false negatives, where recall = ​TP / ​(TP+FN) and precision               
= ​TP / ​(TP+FP)​. We used 10-fold cross validation with 50,000 hateful tweets and 50,000 safe                
tweets, meaning that 10 tests were performed with a different 9/10 of training data and 1/10                
of testing data each, then averaging the results (see also Hartung, Klinger, Schmidtke, &              
Vogel 2017 for related prior work).  
5.2 Cross-domain Evaluation 
In ML, domain adaptation refers to the problem that a model trained on one kind of data will                  
perform poorly on other kinds of data. For example, our model is trained on tweets and may                 
perform poorly on blog posts because no training examples were ever provided for this kind               
18 ​Proof-of-concept in Python code: https://gist.github.com/tom-de-smedt/9c9d9b9168ba703e0c336ee0128ebae5 
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of data. To estimate the scalability of our model, we tested its performance on a number of                 
out-of-domain resources: 
1. A hold-out set of the 1,000 most offensive examples in the hate speech dataset was composed                
by human annotators. This set was not used for training. We tested the trained model on the                 
hold-out set, and about 92% of those tweets are correctly predicted as hateful. 
2. A hold-out set of the 1,000 least offensive examples in the hate speech dataset was composed                
by human annotators. This set was not used for training. We tested the trained model on the                 
hold-out set, and about 76% of those tweets are correctly predicted as safe. 
3. We collected a 1,000 web pages from a far-right conspiracy website. About 98% of these               19
pages are correctly predicted as hateful. 
4. We collected a 100 random articles from the German Wikipedia, which content is moderated              
for neutrality (NPOV).  About 90% of the articles are predicted as safe. 20
 
6 Discussion 
In this section, we first summarize our insights from the descriptive parts of the paper, and                
the results of the ML experiment on automatic hate speech detection, before discussing the              
implications of our findings. Our main aim was to examine right-wing German hate speech              
on Twitter from a linguistic perspective. At the time of the 2017 German federal elections,               
we found a high number of tweets targeting Angela Merkel’s immigration policy, and             
implicating refugees in criminal activities, often with the aim of spreading propaganda. The             
majority of these tweets use hateful language, especially to describe immigrants, but also             
politicians and other voters. As argued, a considerable part of the content is deceptive and               
dehumanizing, and some (but few) of the tweets are illegal according to German law. While               
hate speech is characterized by lexical elements like direct derogatory words or profanity, our              
analysis also shows that this does not apply to all hate tweets. Instead, a part of them are                  
marked by creative language and more indirect offense, such as creative metaphors to             
designate targets, phraseological modifications, and indirect speech acts. 
19 ​http://wien.orf.at/news/stories/2901924 
20 ​https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Neutraler_Standpunkt 
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Automatic detection systems can help to identify hate speech. We demonstrated that even a              
basic ML experiment can yield reliable results. Without doubt, the reliability of our model              
can be improved by more recent techniques (e.g., Deep Learning systems with embeddings).             
Another improvement would be taking into account the multimodality of tweets, such as             
text-image relations, since they are necessary to fully capture online political discourse. But             
finding ways to improve detection systems is only part of the challenge. The question is also                
where they can and should be applied. How much responsibility are we willing to delegate to                
AI for content moderation, especially for the removal of content? Even the best-performing             
systems to date for German hate speech are not entirely reliable, especially since some types               21
of hate speech (e.g., implicit) are difficult to detect. Deploying such systems without             
oversight risks producing a problematic amount of under- and overblocking. Hence, these            
systems should be used primarily to ​support​ human moderators of online forums. 
We discussed how only a minority of tweets that may be perceived as hateful is actually                
illegal. Once reported, it is this fraction that will have to be removed according to NetzDG                
and the EU Code of Conduct. While other tweets may well be undesirable and morally               
questionable, they are protected by freedom of speech. So, if the majority of perceived hate               
speech is protected, do we actually need all the media coverage and the investments in AI                
detection tools? We argue that online hate speech is not just a matter of the law, but a societal                   
challenge regarding common decency, human dignity, and democratic values. Consider that           
children in classrooms around the world are usually reprimanded when they say nasty things,              
illegal or not. This is because we have an interest in raising them to respect other people, in                  
the hope that ‘good behaviour’ is reciprocated, fostering productive social interactions. As            
global voices in a digitalized society, we are still in our infancy in how we use social media                  
for communication. Perhaps saying nasty things online should be reprimanded too, lest it             
becomes the new normal.  
Hateful tweets are often not just expressions of opinion, but a tactic used by extremists               
attempting to normalize their ideology. This can inspire others to express themselves in a              
similar way (Langton 2018). In today’s society, even political leaders broadcast expressions            
from the Nazi era, which only a few years ago would have provoked a scandal. When a                 
member of German parliament speaks of ​Machtergreifung (‘seizure of power’), promising to            
21 ​See GermEval Shared Task on the Identification of Offensive Language Online 2018 (Wiegand, Siegel, & Ruppenhofer 2018). 
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make things difficult for immigrants and dissidents, this is now frowned upon but not              22
considered exceptional anymore. Exactly how this escalation of online hate should be            
addressed remains an open question. In a society where all may speak, perhaps not by               
removing their voices. But history has also shown the consequences of letting everyone say              
whatever they want in any way they want. 
Some of these observations can also be linked to two essential principles in linguistics: (1)               
Language as an expression of how we think, of cognition, i.e., likely to indicate if a user is                  
angry or not, and (2) language as also producing cognition. For example, if immigrants are               
repeatedly targeted with dehumanizing expressions, portrayed as infestations, this language          
use will spread. Also, the framing mechanism (see section 3) will influence the default values               
by which the cognitive frames of each individual are filled for concepts of immigration.              23
When characteristics like ​kriminell ​(‘criminal’), gewaltbereit (‘willing to use violence’) or           
arbeitsscheu ​(‘lazy’) are repeatedly ascribed to refugees, the likelihood that we will think of              
refugees in terms of these characteristics increases, irrespective of reality. Similarly, if we             
habitually call politicians ​Verräter (‘traitors’), ​Kinderficker (‘pedos’) or ​Vollpfosten         
(‘idiots’), it will become more and more difficult to take them seriously.  
To conclude, it is certainly true that we do not remove attitudes by removing the expression                
thereof. However, perhaps by being more restrictive of what morally questionable but legally             
acceptable content we accept online, we also have an influence on how extremist ideologies              
spread to the general population. In other words, accepting fewer offensive utterances online             
might help to reduce the reproduction of stereotypes and discrimination in the future.  
 
  
22 ​https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/die-afd-vor-den-wahlen-zwischen-umfragehoch-und-internem.724.de.html?dram:article_id=457285  
23 ​A frame is a data structure that is activated when we mention a word (for example), which has slots that must be filled with specific data; 
these slots are usually filled with some default values that can easily be adapted (cf. Minsky 1974:1f). 
26/31 
Bibliography 
ARTICLE 19 (2018). Responding to ‘hate speech’: Comparative overview of six EU countries.             
London: Free Word Centre.  
https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ECA-hate-speech-compilation-report_
March-2018.pdf 
Amendt, Jürgen (2015). Unwort des Jahrhunderts. »Lügenpresse«: Medienkritik, Medien-         
verdrossenheit, Medienverachtung. ​Neues Deutschland​, January 15.  
https://www.neues-deutschland.de/artikel/958459.unwort-des-jahrhunderts.html  
Assimakopoulos, Stavros, Baider, Fabienne H., & Millar, Sharon (2017), eds. ​Online hate speech in              
the European Union: A discourse-analytic perspective​. Heidelberg: Springer.  
Berger, J. M. (2018). The alt-right Twitter census. Defining and describing the audience for alt-right               
content on Twitter. Dublin: VOX-Pol.  
https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/AltRightTwitterCensus.pdf 
Brown, Alexander (2017). What is hate speech? Part 1: The myth of hate. ​Law and Philosophy                
36:419-468. 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2017). Was ist Hate Speech? July 12.  
http://www.bpb.de/252396/was-ist-hate-speech 
Cohen, Roni (2014). Regulating hate speech: Nothing customary about it. ​Chicago Journal of             
International Law​ 15(1):229-255. 
Colleoni, Elanor, Rozza, Alessandro, & Arvidsson, Adam (2014). Echo chamber or public sphere?             
Predicting political orientation and measuring political homophily in Twitter using big data.            
Journal of Communication​ 64(2):317-332. 
Collins, Michael (2002). Discriminative training methods for hidden markov models: Theory and            
experiments with perceptron algorithms. In ​Proceedings of the 2002 Conference on Empirical            
Methods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP)​, 1-8. ACL Anthology. 
Conover, Michael D., Ratkiewicz, Jacob, Francisco, Matthew R., Gonçalves, Bruno, Menczer,           
Filippo, & Flammini, Alessandro (2011). Political polarization on Twitter. In ​Proceedings of            
the Fifth International Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (ICWSM)​, 89-96. AAAI. 
Davey, Jacob, & Ebner, Julia (2017). The fringe insurgency: Connectivity, convergence and            
mainstreaming of the extreme right. London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue.  
http://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/The-Fringe-Insurgency-221017_2.pdf 
27/31 
De Smedt, Tom, & Daelemans, Walter (2012). Pattern for Python. ​Journal of Machine Learning              
Research​ 13:2063-2067. 
Ellul, Jacques (1965).​ Propaganda: The formation of men’s attitudes ​. New York: Vintage Books. 
Entman, Robert M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. ​Journal of             
Communication​ 43(4):51-58. 
Europol (2019). European Union terrorism situation and trend report. European Union Agency for             
Law Enforcement Cooperation.  
https://w019_final.pdfww.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/tesat_2 
Eurostat (2017). Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex: Annual              
aggregated data (rounded). Retrieved March 31, 2018.  
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/MIGR_ASYAPPCTZA 
Farkas, Johan, & Neumayer, Christina (2018). Disguised propaganda from digital to social media. ​In              
Jeremy Hunsinger, Lisbeth Klastrup, & Matthew M. Allen (eds.), ​Second International           
Handbook of Internet Research​, 1-17. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Fisch, William B. (2002). Hate speech the constitutional law of the United States. ​The American               
Journal of Comparative Law​ 50:463-492. 
Geyer, Klaus (2017). ​Hassrede–eine Analyse von Nutzerkommentaren in Online-Medien.         
Miteinander: Informationen Des Verbandes Der Deutsch Lehrenden Litauens ​ 55(2):5-9. 
Goff, Phillip Atiba, Eberhardt, Jennifer L., Williams, Melissa J., and Jackson, Matthew Christian             
(2008). Not yet human: implicit knowledge, historical dehumanization, and contemporary          
consequences. ​Journal of Personality and Social Psychology​ 94(2):292-306. 
Goodrick-Clarke, Nicolas (1993). ​The occult roots of Nazism: Secret Aryan cults and their influence              
on Nazi ideology​. New York: NYU Press. 
Griffen, Scott (2017). ​Defamation and insult laws in the OSCE region: A comparative study. Vienna:               
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 
Hartung, Matthias, Klinger, Roman, Schmidtke, Franziska, & Vogel, Lars (2017). Identifying           
right-wing extremism in German Twitter profiles: A classification approach. In ​22nd           
International Conference on Applications of Natural Language & Information Systems          
(NLDB)​, 320-325. Cham: Springer. 
Haslam, Nick, & Loughnan, Steve (2014). Dehumanization and infrahumanization. ​Annual Review of            
Psychology​ 65:399-423. 
28/31 
Heine, Matthias (2015). “Lügenpresse” versteht man jetzt auch im Ausland. ​Welt​, March 9.  
https://www.welt.de/kultur/article138227327/Luegenpresse-versteht-man-jetzt-auch-im-Ausla
nd.html 
Hentges, Gudrun, Kökgiran, Gürcan, Nottbohm, Kristina (2014). Die Identitäre Bewegung          
Deutschland (IBD) – Bewegung oder virtuelles Phänomen. ​Forschungsjournal Soziale         
Bewegungen - PLUS​ 3:1-26. 
Hornik, Kurt, Feinerer, Ingo, Kober, Martin, & Buchta, Christian (2012). Spherical k-means            
clustering. ​Journal of Statistical Software​ 50(10):1-22. 
Jaki, Sylvia (2014). ​Phraseological substitutions in newspaper headlines: “More than meats the eye” ​.             
Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
Jowett, Garth S., & O’Donnell, Victoria (2019). ​Propaganda & persuasion​. 7th ed. Los Angeles.:              
Sage. 
Liu, Huan, & Motoda, Hiroshi (2007), eds. ​Computational methods of feature selection​. Boca Raton,              
FL: CRC Press. 
Kreißel, Philip, Ebner, Julia, Urban, Alexander, & Guhl, Jakob (2018). Hass auf Knopfdruck.             
Rechtsextreme Trollfabriken und das Ökosystem koordinierter Hasskampagnen im Netz.         
London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue. 
https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ISD_Ich_Bin_Hier_2.pdf 
Maireder, Axel, & Ausserhofer, Julian (2014). Political discourses on Twitter. In Katrin Weller, Axel              
Bruns, Jean Burgess, Merja Mahrt, & Cornelius Puschmann (eds.), ​Twitter and society​,            
305-318. New York: Peter Lang. 
Mees, Bernard T. (2008). ​The science of the swastika​. Budapest: Central European University Press. 
Meibauer, Jörg (2013). Hassrede: von der Sprache zur Politik. In: Jörg Meibauer (ed.), ​Hassrede/Hate              
Speech. Interdisziplinäre Beiträge zu einer aktuellen Diskussion​. Gießen: Gießener         
Elektronische Bibliothek. 
Mieder, Wolfgang (1993). ​Proverbs are never out of season: Popular wisdom in the modern age​.               
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Mikolov, Tomas, Sutskever, Ilya, Chen, Kai, Corrado, Greg. S., & Dean, Jeffrey (2013). Distributed              
representations of words and phrases and their compositionality. In ​Advances in Neural            
Information Processing Systems (NIPS)​ 25:3111-3119. 
Minsky, Marvin (1974). A framework for representing knowledge. ​MIT-AI Laboratory Memo​ 306. 
29/31 
Musolff, Andreas (2015). ​Dehumanizing metaphors in UK immigrant debates in press and online             
media. ​Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict​ 3(1): 41-56. 
Nockleby, John T. (2000). Hate Speech. In ​Encyclopedia of the American Constitution​. 2nd ed. Edited               
by Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst et al. New York: Macmillan. 
Pal, Joyojeet, & Gonawela, A’Ndre (2017). Studying political communication on Twitter: The case             
for small data. ​Current Opinion on Behavioral Sciences ​ 18:97-102. 
Pang, Bo, & Lee, Lillian (2008). Opinion mining and sentiment analysis. ​Foundations and Trends in               
Information Retrieval​ 2(1/2):1-135. 
Pilz, Gunter A. (n.d.). ​Fußballfankulturen und Gewalt - Wandlungen des Zuschauerverhaltens: Vom            
Kuttenfan und Hooligan zum postmodernen Ultra und Hooltra. Hannover: Universität          
Hannover, Institut für Sportwissenschaft. 
Puneßen, Anja (2016). Hate Speech und Rechtsfragen. Köln: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kinder- und           
Jugendschutz Landesstelle NRW e.V.  
https://www.ajs.nrw.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/AJS-Merkblatt_Hate-Speech_Rechtsfrag
en.pdf 
Langton, Rae (2018). The authority of hate speech. ​Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law​ 3:123-152. 
Remus, Robert, Quasthoff, Uwe, & Heyer, Gerhard (2010). SentiWS – a publicly available             
German-language resource for sentiment analysis. In ​Proceedings of the Seventh International           
Conference on Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC)​, 1168-1171. 
Reuters (2016). German spy agency says ISIS sending fighters disguised as refugees. February 5.  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security/german-spy-agency-says-isis-sending-fi
ghters-disguised-as-refugees-idUSKCN0VE0XL 
Reuters (2018). Zuckerberg apologizes in Congress, Facebook shares rise. April 11.  
https://www.reuters.com/video/2018/04/11/zuckerberg-apologizes-in-congress-facebo?videoI
d=416656284 
Ruppenhofer, Josef, Siegel, Melanie, & Wiegand, Michael. 2018. Guidelines for IGGSA shared task             
on the identification of offensive language.  
http://www.coli.uni-saarland.de/~miwieg/Germeval/guidelines-iggsa-shared.pdf 
Searle, John R. (2008). ​Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language​. 30th ed. Cambridge:                
Cambridge University Press. 
Sponholz, Liriam (2018). ​Hate Speech in den Massenmedien: Theoretische Grundlagen und           
empirische Umsetzung​. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. 
30/31 
Stone, Geoffrey R. (1994). Hate speech and the U.S. Constitution. ​3 East European Constitutional              
Review​ 78:78-82. 
Takács, Imre (2015). Corona et crux-heraldry and crusader symbolism on 13th century Hungarian             
royal seals. ​Hortus Artium Medievalium​ 21:54-61. 
Turner-Graham, Emily (2015). Subcultural style: Fashion and Britain’s extreme right. In Nigel            
Copsey & John E. Richardson (eds.), ​Cultures of post-war British fascism​, 128-141.            
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Twitter (2016). Combating Violent Extremism. February 5.  
https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/a/2016/combating-violent-extremism.html 
Vosoughi, Soroush, & Roy, Deb (2016). Tweet acts: A speech act classifier for Twitter. In               
Proceedings of the 10th Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (ICWSM)​, 711-714. AAAI. 
Waseem, Zeerak, Davidson, Thomas, Warmsley, Dana, & Weber, Ingmar (2017). Understanding           
abuse: A typology of abusive language detection subtasks. In ​Proceedings of the First             
Workshop on Abusive Language Online​, 78-84. 
YouGov (2016). German attitudes to immigration harden following Cologne attacks. January 12. 
https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/01/12/germans-attitudes-immigration-harden-following-col/ 
Zhang, Renxian, Gao, Dehong, & Li, Wenjie (2011). What are tweeters doing: Recognizing speech              
acts in Twitter. In ​Analyzing Microtext: Papers from the 2011 AAAI Workshop​ ​(AMW)​, 86-91. 
Zifonun, Gisela. 2016. Warum wir ​Gutmensch ​brauchen. ​Sprachreport​ 32(2):26. 
31/31 
